Mark Phillips: The American Question

11/3/01: Dynamics of Struggle in the Islamic World.

INTRODUCTION

I want to pose some theoretical questions about the dynamics of nationalism in Islamic societies. Many activists have traditionally articulated a pretty specific analysis of the dynamics of third-world liberation struggles. I'll paraphrase that and then pose my questions.

PARAPHRASE

Rural classes are unable to wield state power. Governance requires an urban class. Probably the most telling confirmation is the Mexican revolution, in which a peasant uprising, led by peasants, won: that is, seized the state. But, unable to govern, turned it over to the bourgeoisie and went home. We often summarize by saying that liberation movements require urban leadership, although if we're being super strict the summary is maybe a little imprecise.

But, the class dynamics of imperialism render it unlikely that third world bourgeoisies will be interested in placing themselves at the head of liberation struggles. By and large, third world capitalists are likely to be in bed with imperialism: dependent for their property and security. In most cases third world bourgeoisies will be counterrevolutionary. Perhaps the Vietnamese experience would be a nifty example.

Thus it's likely that national liberation struggles will be led by lefties of some stripe. Do note the neat way I sidestepped the question of whether intellectuals with socialist-tinged ideology constitute class leadership. Indeed the likelihood is that liberation struggles will tend to be anticapitalist to at least some degree, and, in possession of state power, will be very likely to take defensive measures resulting in inroads into private property. Thus struggles that begin with "democratic" agendas, that is a national liberation perspective, are going to tend to dovetail into "socialist" measures. The best example of this dynamic might be Cuba.

QUESTIONS

a. Who leads the popular struggles in the Islamic world? Representatives of an urban class? What class?

b. Are the bourgeoisies in these societies revolutionary, counterrevolutionary, or all mixed up? (Bin Laden was born into the upper bourgeoisie in Saudi Arabia.)

c. Since the Iranian revolution there have been vibrant, militant, sustained mass nationalist movements with strong anti-imperialist flavors in Lebanon, Palestine, Algeria, etc. Yet these movements do not have "lefty" leaderships. Their leaderships are so reactionary we sometimes call them "feudal". What implications are there for our theory? ¹ 

d. The Islamic fundamentalist movements very often employ tactics traditionally associated with the working class. There was a 100% general strike in Karachi on 10/12/01. The movements even have an internationalist perspective. (So did European Fascism, of course.) ²  What does this mean?

e. What kinds of formations are the fundamentalist "networks"?

ENDNOTES

¹ "Fundamentalist Islam is not a nationalist movement, but in its drive to expel Western control and influence from the Muslim world, it has arisen as a substitute - at once more recidivist and more radical - for local nationalisms that failed: Nasser, the FLN, Al-Fatah." Perry Anderson, unpublished exchange with Mike Davis, received via e-mail on 10/16/01. (Back to article.)

² "Likewise the most important ingredient in the current recipe is surely the existence of such a large, ínternationalist cadre of veteran warriors - armed and financed by the USA, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan -- sharing similar discipline, goals and indoctrination, but indestructibly dispersed across the landscape of three continents. Nothing like this has existed since the Comintern in the 1920s." Davis, ibid. (Back to article.)

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