Media Control : the spectacular achievements of propaganda
Noam Chomsky, Media Control : the spectacular achievements of propaganda
Around 2005 I cataloged a video for the library where I work. In 1990 Edward Bernays, the creator of public relations as we presently understand it, spoke at my school. He was about 100 years old at the time and died a few years later. He gave a fascinating talk and although all that happened was a staionary camera focused on him as he told stories for a couple of hours I took a bit longer to catalog the tape for having found myself taken up with the narrative. He told a story about World War I in which he mentioned, only in passing, that at the time he was doing some "work as a civilian advisor' to the War Department. He did not say "the Creel Commission," which leads me to believe that he at least had some idea that many view his work as something other than noble or admirable. If he thought his work good and honorable, why did he talk about anything else but how he helped invent propaganda and worked to bring the United States into the First World War.
This book by Chomsky provides the background and context to help understand why one of the father's of propaganda would evade credit (or blame?) while telling the story of public relations. Unlike his longer books, this one proves very easy to read and much more straight-forward. Small independent presses have, over the last 10 years or so, published short, pocket sized, books of Chomsky's thoughts on a given theme. When heavily edited, Chomsky comes across as far more accessible and understandable than in his larger works, such as Necessary Illusions or Manufacturing Consent.
The creators of propaganda, Edward Bernays and Walter Lippmann, left no doubt about how they saw democracy and their place in it. We could have a participatory democracy in which people have the information about policy and a chance to discuss and influence it, or we can have a "spectator democracy" (Lippmann's term, not Chomsky's) in which a "specialized class" of "responsible men" make the decisions for the common interests and the "bewildered herd" (Lippmann again) does not participate. This is supposed to be good because "the common interests elude the bewildered herd. They can't figure them out."
The word "Propoganda" has acquired a pejorative meaning. Those creating and disseminating it have a need to avoid having their life's work recognized for what it is. As such you read and hear numerous definitions of "propaganda" and various self-serving explanations of what does and does not constitute this type of communication. Chomsky takes most of the book to describe and define propaganda and place it in the context of U.S. history. This will help you understand the power (and some of the origins) of the narratives that the right-wing employs, pinpoints the function of propaganda and in so doing provides insight into how we can reverse its effects. Propaganda that functions well, according to Chomsky, prevents people from asking substantive questions. Slogans such as "Support the Troops" make as much sense as "Support the people of Iowa." The question we're "not supposed to ask" is "what about the policy that sent the troops to [where-ever]." The best attack on propaganda comes from asking the questions that the propaganda attempts to prevent people from asking.
Chomsky's conclusion speaks for itself :
"... The issue is whether we want to live in a free society or whether we want to live under what amounts to a form of self-imposed totalitarianism, with the bewildered herd marginalized, directed elsewhere, terrified, screaming patriotic slogans, fearing for their lives and admiring with awe the leader who saved them from destruction, while the educated masses goose-step on command and repeat the slogans they're supposed to repeat and the society deteriorates at home. We end up serving as a mercenary enforcer state, hoping that others are going to pay us to smash up the world..."
Comments
Is there a distinction to be made between "propaganda" and "narrative", as TT uses the latter term? I would suggest yes, that narrative is a form of communication while propaganda is a specific practice of communication based on repetition combined with specific use of the material means of communication.
Are "narrative" and "propaganda" the same order of discourse? Not sure, but I think probably not. "Support the troops" is a different kind of story than "The Germans bayonetted Belgian babies." Does that matter?
What is it that makes one "propagandum" effective, while another fails?
These are pretty much random questions, but I'll point out a logical complex which I do find weak in Chomsky's work on media analysis and propaganda. He blurs the distinction between propaganda and narrative; he suggests that both are equally deliberate; and he assumes that both work at the level of consciousness. The result is a strong streak of conspiracy theory throughout his political work which is disempowering to the movements of opposition which he would like to further.
Posted by: Mark Phillips | September 13, 2006 08:11 PM
I first encounterd the word "Narrative" in the sense you use it on this site and in conversation with you. Chomsky does not use the word "narrative" much less deal with the fine distinctions found on Trouble-Tickets and in your comment. I agree that Chomsky's readings of primary sources and the expression of his views in writing states or implies a deliberateness and ascribes some form of conspiracy to his analysis. I think the kinds of distinctions you point out are very important for people to think about when they deal with the narrratives from the right. I also think it a good idea to understand where many of these narratives come from, and as Chomsky explains, they come from a deliberate form of "narrative" called propaganda. (My use of the term "narrative" not Chomsky's).
As for the distinction between two different kinds of "stories," I can summarize Chomsky's analysis (although the book does not address the specific question of the difference between "propaganda" and "narrative" the way Trouble-tickets does) and also address the question you posed: "What is it that makes one "propagandum" effective, while another fails?" Chomsky states in this book "... State propaganda, when supported by the educated classes and when no deviation is permitted from it, can have a big effect." The lack of an actual (that is to say in a real sense) 2nd party to challenge the Republican/Democrat party makes deviations from the narratives non-existent or so few as have no effect. Chomsky expresses amazement (as do I) that "the Creel Commission ... succeeded, within six months, in turning a pacifist [U.S.] population into a hysterical, war-mongering population which wanted to destroy everything German, tear the Germans limb from limb, go to war and save the world." How did they do that? It did not take much -- mostly fabricated stories of German soldiers bayonetting Belgian babies. The scary part is that as long as long as no one challenges the "party line" convincing people to go to war proves very easy. This specific (and untrue) "story" is one "incarnation" or "kind" of propaganda.
Later in the book Chomsky argues that most propaganda is meaningless when you think about it, makes statements no one would ever argue against (i.e.: "Support the troops") as a way to prevent people from discussing (or thinking about) policy. "It's [the slogan's] crucial value is that it diverts your attention from a question that does mean something: Do you support our policy?" Thus, for what it's worth, Chomsky does not make that distinction between different "kinds" of stories: he sees both as propaganda - lies and slogans.
I decided to review this book on TT because it gives us some historical background and a better idea of what we are up against. It would interest me to know what about the conspiratorial elements of his analysis you find disempowering to opposition movements? Does it lead to discrediting them with the stigma of conspiracy nuts? Does it demoralize them by making the task of countering narrative look insurmountable? Other ways? What sort of distinctions between propaganda and narrative do you think will prove helpful to activists? How and why?
Posted by: Steven Dunlap | September 14, 2006 05:59 PM
> It would interest me to know what about the conspiratorial elements of his analysis you find disempowering to opposition movements? Does it lead to discrediting them with the stigma of conspiracy nuts? Does it demoralize them by making the task of countering narrative look insurmountable? Other ways?
It makes it impossible to formulate a strategy which offers a possibility of success.
The war isn't about oil pipelines through Afghanistan, it's about destroying the Islamic Revolution. Recognize that and you can begin to make reasonable predictions about how both sides will proceed. You can also begin to stake out a progressive politics. Vis: confrontation with Islamic Fundamentalism is the right thing to do; but the Imperialist strategy of war and occupation is an incompetent way to approach it. I don't know whether Chomsky advocates the specific conspiracy theory I chose for this example; I only chose it as an example of why conspiracy theory is bad.
So that when Chomsky stresses propaganda-as-conspiracy, what he loses is narrative-as-unconscious, dooming the progressive left to the standard, failed practice of struggle via pedagogy. Which doesn't work.
I realize this is pretty clipped, but I hope it points in a helpful direction!
Posted by: Mark Phillips | September 15, 2006 01:35 AM
Another quick thought. When Chomsky stresses propaganda-as-conspiracy, he not only loses narrative-as-unconsicous, he also loses *complexity*. Conspiracy is simple, isn't it? But reality isn't, and this is one of the reasons why conspiracy theory blocks the way toward effective oppositional strategy.
An illustration of complexity in this context. Take that narrative, "Support our troops!" It's effective not because it means nothing, but precisely because it means so many things. Something different to each group, I think.
Where do you see "Support our troops!" stickers most offen? Limos or pickup trucks? Right: that slogan is very popular among American working people. Why? Because, I think, the emphasis to them is on the word "our". "Our troops", literally: "our troops" are their family members. Does that imply an endorsement of the policy? Not necessarily. Indeed, it makes it possible to talk to people about that policy.
Narratives are overdetermined: multiply determined. Propaganda and conspiracy are simple. Strategy that hopes to succeed can't be based on simplicity.
Again, very clipped, but I hope it helps.
Posted by: Mark Phillips | September 15, 2006 01:49 AM
While I agree that Chomsky's work has a "conspiracy theory" streak to it at the same time he has a solid base of verifiable evidence for all his conclusions. He defends himself from such charges (as I recall from the documentary "Manufacturing Consent") with the example "To say the General Motors seeks to increase profit and market share no one call conspiracy theory. That's institutional analysis. What I am doing is also institutional analysis." That said, the point of my agreement with your comments comes from how his focus on institutional actions and causes has the effect of "cutting out" consideration of the actions of individuals ("non-members" of the institutions and elites that Chomsky describes). In this I refer to your example of how the slogans means something different to different people. He also does not consider (at least not in this book) how a given "myth" takes on a life of its own shortly after inception, the differences in meaning such myths can have for different people and the emotional intensity with which people hang on to them. The book does include some discussion of the difference between "spectator democracy" (what Chomsky argues we have now) and "participatory democracy" (what we and Chomsky would like). This includes some very eloquent passages on the importance of doing so but does not give any details as to how to make the transition from one to the other. What ideas do you have for making this transition?
I do continue to stand by my conclusion in my review: that many of the "myths" or "narratives" people believe came from above, from members of institutions, that these myths are not "organic" or "original" to the vast majority of the people who believe them; and therefore, we can overturn them (or at least offer alternatives that actually speak to people's better nature). For example, Chomsky's analysis of what the mainstream media calls "the Vietnam Syndrome" in this book is interesting in this regard. He cites one person's definition of the term (acknowledging the many that exist): Reaganite Norman Podhoretz called it "the sickly inhibitions against the use of force." In other words, the vast majority of people are not blood thirsty lunatics. This I find cause for optimism.
On the subject of Chomsky's solid base of verifiable evidence, we have seen that this together with a bus pass will take you across town and not much else. No one cares about evidence or veracity outside of a small group a friend of mine refers to as "the chattering classes." I find myself stuck in this groove sometimes as well. What advice do you have for people who have tunnel vision for the lies and sophistry, who would like to see or bring about change but find themselves bogged down in the minutia?
Posted by: Steven Dunlap | September 16, 2006 10:22 AM
I dunno that I'm the right one to go around giving people advice. I'll share what's on my mind and if that turns out to be helpful, hallelujah.
I believe that for many individuals who are seeking a way forward as activists for social justice, two kinds of behavior change are urgent. Note individuals, not movements or groups.
1. We need to seriously, really qualitatively improve our theoretical chops. Lenin said something like, "Without revolutionary theory there's no revolutionary strategy", or words to that effect. That's really true, and not just for self-styled "Revolutionaries". One reason why we on "the left" have responded to "The War on Terror" in such anaemic ways is that we lack integral, concrete analyses of what the war is about. The prevalence of doofy conspiracy theory is symptomatic, as is the unhelpful abstractness of the slogans we march under. Sadly, this kind of abstractness has been typical of the American left for at least as long as it and myself have been on a first-name basis. We have to change this, and by changing it, help to raise the overall effectiveness of the movements we participate in.
2. We need to ditch the pedagogical model of political engagement. In part this means learning to stop lecturing people -- I mean real people, not intellectuals -- and to listen to them instead. To pick on Chomsky once again. There's a super-straightforward reason why he believes that the slogan "Support our troops!" is meaningless, like the nonsense phrase "Support the people of Iowa!" He's never actually asked anybody what it means to them. He offers an intellectual's perspective, with an intellectual's pedagogical style of political practice taken directly from his profession. Which makes it difficult for him to communicate meaningfully with the driver of that pickup truck with the "Support our troops!" bumper sticker.
It may seem like these two "behavior changes" are contradictory: be more intellectual, be less intellectual. They're not. They're complementary. They really mean, base our work on a strategy that can win; and learn to talk to real people. In the end that's pretty much the same thing.
So that's Mark on a Soapbox for this Saturday. Tune in again next week...
Posted by: Mark Phillips | September 16, 2006 12:52 PM
One more thought, then I'll shut up.
It seems to me that the best way to understand the victory of the Creel Commission would be to undertake a highly concrete analysis of the struggle it waged, in the context in which it waged them. It's a start simply to stress that it won a victory in a struggle. Now to ask: why did the other side lose?
Compare the Creel Commission experience with the run up to Gulf Wars I and II. In both of those experiences the antiwar forces lost. But, there were very considerable antiwar forces who responded quickly and massively. They lost. Why?
What are the differences with the concrete experiences of pro-war/anti-war struggle in 1917, 1990, and 2003? That's a great question.
Posted by: Mark Phillips | September 17, 2006 01:47 PM